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International Franchising
ERIK

B.

WULFF*

The most significant development in international franchising this year was the promulgation of new franchise regulations in China.
On December 30, 2004, the Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China
(MOFCOM) promulgated the Measuresfor the Regulation of CommercialFranchise(Franchise

Measures), which became effective on February 1, 2005. These new Franchise Measures
have generated a great deal of discussion and concern, as China is increasingly being regarded as a key growth market, with a fast-expanding middle class and an entrepreneurial
spirit.'
I. Key Provisions of the Chinese Franchise Measures
A.

DEFINITION OF "FRANCHISE" AND "FRANCHISE FEE"

The Franchise Measures define a franchise as "an arrangement whereby a franchisor,
through an agreement with a franchisee, grants the franchisee the right to use business
operating resources including trademarks, trade names, business models, etc.,... [and] [tihe
franchisee shall operate under the uniform franchise system and pay franchise fees to the

*Erik B. Wulff is a partner with DLA Piper Rudnick Gray Cary US LLP. Mr. Wulff is active in the ABAs
Section of International Law and Practice, currently serving as Vice-Chair of the European Law Committee,
Vice-Chair of the International Commercial Transaction Committee, and Co-Chair of the Section's 2005 spring
meeting. He is also the Editor In Chief of Leader's FranchisingBusiness & Law Alert. He is a member of the
Governing Committee of the ABAs Forum on Franchising (1988-1991) and a former associate editor of the
ABA Franchise Law Journal.Mr. Wulff has a broad-based practice in franchising law, business law, and international business transactions, and has extensive experience in all aspects of representing franchising and distribution companies, including domestic and international expansion.
1. According to BNP Paribas Peregrine, the investment banking arm of BNP Paribas in Asia there were 50
million Chinese families in 2002 that fell into its definition of "middle class family," with an average annual
household income of RMB75,000 ($9,040 USD) and household assets of RMB310,000 ($37,350 USD). "Middle
class families" make up about 13.5% of the total Chinese population of 1.3 billion. By 2010, the middle class
will grow to approximately 100 million families with an average annual household income of RMB150,000
($18,080 USD) and household assets of RMB620,000 ($74,700 USD). BNP Paribas Peregrine also predicted
that the consumption rate would increase from 50% in 2002 to 65% by 2010, and to 71% by 2020, close to
the level of developed countries. Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the United States of America,
Chinese Middle-class FamiliesDefined (June 2, 2004), at http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/gyzg/t127568.htm.
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franchisor."2 This definition essentially consists of three somewhat familiar elements: (1) a
trademark or business model; (2) a uniform system; and (3) a franchise fee. However, unlike
many of the franchise disclosure laws and regulations in the United States, the Franchise
Measures do not provide for any exemptions or exclusions from its rather broad definition
of "franchise."
Moreover, the definition of the term "franchise fee" is equally broad. Article 14 of the
Franchise Measures provides that franchise fees include any "fees paid by a franchisee to
obtain the franchise," including initial fees, royalties, and other agreed-upon fees? This
definition does not explicitly include or exclude payments for goods supplied by the franchisor at bona fide wholesale prices, an exclusion commonly found in U.S. franchise statutes
and regulations. Thus, product distribution franchisors are left with uncertainty as to
whether they are covered, although one could reasonably assert that the purchase ofproduct
is not a "fee" as contemplated by the Franchise Measures. Finally, the Franchise Measures
require that fees be set by the parties to the agreement and, more importantly determined
on the basis of fair dealing and reasonableness. The scope and impact of this obligation
remains to be seen-it certainly raises concerns for franchisors whose policy is that initial
fees and royalties are non-negotiable.
B.

SCOPE OF COVERAGE

The Franchise Measures expressly provide that they apply if the franchise operations are
conducted within the People's Republic of China.4 As is customary with any other economic
statutes and regulations in the PRC, Hong Kong (and Macao) is excluded from coverage.
That is, Hong Kong companies will be treated as "foreign" companies, and the Franchise
Measures will not apply in Hong Kong.'
The Franchise Measures, however, do not speak to whether foreign franchisors may offer
franchises directly to prospective franchisees without setting up a Foreign Investment Enterprise (FIE) in China-the so-called "direct off-shore" approach to franchising. However,
guidance can be drawn from a separately issued regulation entitled the Measure on the
Management of ForeignInvested Commercial Enterprises(Commercial Sector Measures).6 Un-

der the Commercial Sector Measures, a foreign franchisor is required to establish an FIE
to offer franchises in China.' The two regulations, read together, appear to throw into
doubt the legality of direct off-shore franchising in China.
The Franchise Measures clearly state that they will apply to subfranchising. However,
there is no language spelling out the government's view of various relationships among
franchisors, subfranchisors, and subfranchisees. Moreover, there is no clear statement as to
which party-the franchisor or the subfranchisor-must provide disclosure to prospective

2. Measures for the Regulation of Commercial Franchise, Article 2, (MOFCOM, Feb. 1, 2005), availableat
http://www.envoynews.com/piperrudnick/e-article00344455.cfm?x = bi 1,0w [hereinafter FranchiseMeasure].
3. Id. art. 14.
4. Id. art. 3.
5. Id. art. 37.
6. The Commercial Sector Measures were adopted in April 2004, and became effective on June 1, 2004.
No official translation is available. The US-China Business Council provides its members with an unofficial
translation, which can be found at www.uschina.org.
7. See id. art. 3.
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subfranchisees, or who is responsible for ensuring that the franchise agreement between
the subfranchisor and the subfranchisee conforms to the Franchise Measures.
C. QUALIFICATIONS

TO BE A

FANCHISOR

IN CHINA-THE

"2 + I" REQUIREMENT

The Franchise Measures prescribe a series of "qualifications" for both franchisors and
franchisees. 8 For example, a franchisor must be a duly organized economic entity, have the
right to the trademarks, be able to provide training and guidance, etc. Among the "qualifications" is the so-called "2 + 1" requirement, which is probably the single most controversial provision in the whole regulation. It requires that before offering franchises, a franchisor must first operate two company-owned units in China for more than one year.
D.

DISCLOSURE OBLIGATIONS

Generally, the pre-sale disclosure obligations imposed by the Franchise Measures are not
9
particularly onerous or problematic, with a few notable exceptions. A franchisor is required
to provide a prospective franchisee with a written disclosure document and a copy of the
franchise agreement at least twenty days before signing the agreement. The disclosure
document must contain some basic information, including the franchisor's name and address; the number and locations of the existing outlets; the estimated investment for an
outlet; information on the franchisor's trademarks, copyrights and patents; franchise fees
and deposits; the franchisor's litigation history for the previous five years; training; sources
of products and supplies; and the backgrounds of the franchisor's principal officers.
While the structure of the disclosure obligations is relatively clear, there is uncertainty
as to the nature and extent of some of the required disclosures. Most of these concerns
relate to the breadth of the requirements, which are vaguely worded and, therefore, leave
uncertain a franchisor's disclosure obligations.
Among these vaguely worded obligations is the requirement that franchisors must dis0
close "operational results" of existing franchisees.' If this is intended to require disclosure
of financial performance of existing franchisees, this requirement is tantamount to a mandatory earnings claim. In many other jurisdictions, including the United States, authorities
have considered this concept and almost universally rejected mandatory earnings claims
requirements." While the intent underlying this requirement is not clear, if the Franchise
Measures are construed to require disclosure of historical financial performance data of
franchisees, few, if any, franchisors are likely to possess sufficiently reliable information to
provide this disclosure. And, of course, if a franchisor has no or few franchisees in China,
information on "operational results" in other countries could be misleading to prospective
franchisees in China.
The Franchise Measures also impose another unusual disclosure obligation: the franchi2
sor is to make disclosures "requested by a franchisee."' What does this mean? Can one

8. See Franchise Measures, supra note 2, arts. 7-8.
9. Id. arts. 17-20.
10. Id. art. 19(2).
11. See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission, Trade Regulation Rule on Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning Franchising and Business Opportunities Ventures, 16 C.F.R. Part 436 (Aug. 2004). However,
legal practitioners in Canada have debated whether the Ontario franchise disclosure law (Arthur Wishart Act)
implicitly requires disclosure of financial performance of existing franchisees.
12. Franchise Measures, supra note 2, art. 19(9).
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prospective franchisee require that the disclosure document for all prospective franchisees
contain whatever information he or she requests? On the other hand, if the disclosure
requirement only applies to the franchisee requesting the information, this requirement
sets up a regime for individualized disclosure, leaving the franchisor vulnerable to assertions
that selective disclosure amounts to omissions in the disclosure documents of those who
didn't ask for more information. And, moreover, what if a prospective franchisee asks that
the disclosure document contain proprietary information, such as formulas to secret ingredients? In sum, it is poor public policy to give a prospective franchisee the unfettered right
to enlarge the list of governmental mandated disclosure obligations.
Unlike the pre-existing regulations, the new Franchise Measures grant a private cause of
action to a franchisee for its economic losses caused by a franchisor's misrepresentation or
omission. When coupled with the ambiguous disclosure obligations and the notion of having to disclose whatever a franchisee requests, even the most diligent franchisors will not
be able to gain much comfort that they have fully complied with the law.
E.

FRANCHISOR-FRANCHISEE "RELATIONSHIP" ISSUES

Although largely a disclosure rule, the Franchise Measures do impose some requirements
concerning franchisor-franchisee relationship issues. Some requirements are helpful, reflecting common practices (e.g., that a franchisee not transfer its business without the franchisor's approval). 3 Some only modestly infringe on the parties' freedom to contract (e.g.,
the Franchise Measures require that the term of a franchise agreement generally cannot be
less than three years). 14 In general, the Franchise Measures accord the parties the freedom
to contract and act in accordance with the terms of their agreement. These provisions
provide welcome evidence of the Chinese government's intent to encourage franchising by
recognition of the sanctity of contract.
However, serious concerns arise in that the Franchise Measures seek to impose requirements unrelated to the terms of the franchise agreement itself. As an example, a franchisor
must guarantee the quality of the products sold by its designated suppliers."5 Although this
may reflect the Chinese government's laudatory intention to protect consumers, this requirement makes a franchisor responsible for the products provided by outside suppliers.
Even if this language is intended to distinguish between "approved suppliers" (any of whom
a franchisee is free to choose as its supplier) and "designated suppliers" (from whom a
franchisee is required to purchase certain items), this is an onerous requirement that may
lead franchisors to choose to become sole suppliers of key materials or ingredients. After
all, if one is liable for the product, it is only a natural reaction that one should then be able
to control the product and profit from it.
Moreover, the Franchise Measures impose an obligation that franchise operations be
16
conducted in accordance with the principles of fair dealing, honesty, and trustworthiness.
While there can be little quarrel with the spirit of this language, it remains to be seen how

13. See id. art. 12.
14. Id. art. 15. Interestingly, in China, the term of a franchise has been taken as an indicator of the stability
of the franchise system, which is an important goal of the "orderly" development of franchising. See Chairwoman Geping Guo of CCFA, Opening Remarks at China Franchise Expo 2005, availableat www.ccfa.org.cn.
15. See Franchise Measures, supra note 2, art. 10.
16. See id. art. 5.
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such subjective language will be viewed by Chinese government agencies, as well as Chinese
courts in the context of a typical franchise dispute.
F. APPROVAL PROCESS

Although the Franchise Measures as a whole apply to both domestic and FIE franchisors,
the application and approval system is only imposed on FIE franchisors. Therefore, before
an FIE can offer franchises in China, it must first apply for approval from appropriate
government agencies. 7
To gain approval, an FIE must submit documents, including an application, related board
resolutions, business licenses, bylaws, materials on the FIE's trademark, a copy of the standard franchise agreement, and a copy of the disclosure document. The Franchise Measures
mandate application be made to whichever government agency that initially has the authority to approve the establishment of the FIE-local authorities or, in some cases, the
central government.18
The divide of authority to approve FIEs between the local and central governments
depends on many factors, including the size of the investment and type of FIE, and this is
a somewhat arbitrary process.19 It also remains unclear how different local (mainly provincial) authorities will interpret the approval process and coordinate with MOFCOM and
each other.
This rather muddled approval regime cries for clarification and some semblance of cohesion. In a circular dated April 2, 2005, MOFCOM stated that it would release specific
rules to govern the approval process concerning FIE franchisorszo As of this writing, no
such rule has been released.

17. See id. art. 33. This is not to say, however, that domestic franchisors can offer franchises anytime they
want. Domestic franchisors must also get governmental approval to list "franchising" in their business licenses.
This procedure is not spelled out in the Franchise Measures, and is likely to differ from locale to locale.
18. In most cases, MOFCOM will be the agency responsible for approval at the central government level.
However, certain cases will need approval from the National Commission of Development and Reform
(NCDR). Commissions outrank ministries.
19. In general, the approval authority depends on two factors: the size of the investment and the industry.
Provincial governments can approve FlIEs in "restricted" industries with investments of less than $50 million
USD and FIEs in "encouraged/permitted" industries with investments of less than $100 million USD. Beyond
that, central government approval is required. See NCDR, Interim Measures Regarding the Approvalof Foreign
Investments (Oct. 9, 2004), available (in Mandarin)at www.sdpc.gov.cn. The author has not been able to find
an English translation (official or unofficial) of this regulation. The Catalogof Industriesfor Foreign Investment,
issued jointly by NCDR and MOFCOM, lists which industries are "encouraged/permitted" (e.g., most hightech industries), which are "restricted" (e.g., franchising, direct-selling, tobacco, legal service, etc.), and which
are "prohibited" (e.g., defense industry, casinos, etc.). The newest version was released on November 30, 2004.
is subject to specific
An unofficial English translation is available at www.uschina.org. However, this general rule
regulations issued by the central government. For instance, under the Commercial Sector Measures, regardless
of the amount of the investment, "commercial" FIEs with stores exceeding certain size and number have to be
approved by MOFCOM. "Commercial" FIEs in this case are clearly referring to stores like Wal-Mart, etc.
However, there have been some indications from Chinese government officials that all FIE franchisors will
have to be approved as "commercial" FliEs, even though FIE franchisors were not in mind when the approval
process for the Commercial Sector Measures was drafted.
20. See MOFCOM, Circularon Relevant Issues ConcerningExpansion of the Distributions Operations Scope of
Foreign-investedNoncommercialEnterprises, an unofficial translation available at www.uschina.org.
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PENALTIES

The Franchise Measures provide three specific penalties for violating the disclosure obligations and the provisions prescribing certain "qualifications" of the parties. First, MOFCOM can issue orders to force the parties to comply with the Franchise Measures and
possibly impose fines of no more than RMB30,000 (approximately $3,600 USD). Second,
MOFCOM can prompt the State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC)to
suspend or cancel a franchisor's business license.2" Third, as discussed above, a franchisee
is allowed to sue a franchisor for economic losses caused by misrepresentations and
omissions in the disclosure document.
H.

GRANDFATHERING ExISTING FRANCHISE OPERATIONS

Like most other economic statutes and regulations, the Franchise Measures provide for
grandfathering of those FIE franchisors offering franchises in China prior to the adoption
of these rules. Franchisors are, however, required to file a report with the original registration agency summarizing their franchise operations to date. Although no time frame has
been provided in the Measures, existing FIE franchisors need to monitor further developments. For example, Shanghai Economic Commission (the local commerce authority in
Shanghai) recently issued a notice requiring such filings be done byMay 30, 2005.22 Existing
franchisors must also apply for and meet the conditions of approval (including the "2 + 1"
requirement) to continue offering franchises in China. The requirement that franchisors
with existing franchise operations meet the "2 + 1" requirement does not appear to have
been an oversight. This is perhaps one of the most dubious requirements of the Franchise
Measures. It remains to be seen whether it will be "softened" through interpretation or
whether existing franchisors with substantial and stable franchise systems in China might
obtain exemptions from MOFCOM.
II. Two Major Concerns
Although the Franchise Measures contain a number of problematic provisions, two stand
out as significant concerns: (1) the apparent prohibition against "direct off-shore" franchising; and (2) the "2 + 1" requirement.
A. No

DIRECT OFF-SHORE FRANCHISING

As discussed previously, the Commercial Sector Measures prohibit direct off-shore franchising. The provision at issue appears quite unequivocal. 23 However, the prohibition

21. SAIC is a central government agency somewhat inferior but independent from MOFCOM. SAIC and
its local counterparts are responsible for, among many things, issuing business licenses to companies, and enforcing
many of the economic statutes and regulations. It is reported that the competition between MOFCOM and SAIC
over the enforcement authority is part of the reason for the prolonged delay of the adoption of Franchise
Regulation.
22. See Shanghai Economic Commission, Notice Regarding Implementing the Measures on theRegulation of
Commercial Franchise (Apr. 6, 2005), available (in Mandarin only) at www.mofcom.gov.cn. The wording of this
notice is vague and the application process remains unclear.
23. However, it could be argued that the Commercial Sector Measures were only concerned with foreign
investments in "commercial sectors," and thus franchisors that are not in the "commercial sectors" can disregard
this ban.
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against "direct off-shore" franchising is not found in the Franchise Measures, but instead
in the Commercial Sector Measures, which was issued earlier than the Franchise Measures.
The Franchise Measures themselves are silent on the subject, and the draft Franchise Regulation expressly contemplated the possibility that a franchisor could be a "foreign company"
or an FIE. Therefore, the omission of the FIE requirement in the Franchise Measures
could be interpreted as intentional, and in effect overruling the matter as previously issued
in the Commercial Sector Measures. This omission may reveal an on-going and yet unresolved debate within the Chinese government-an outright ban on foreign franchisors
is probably unattainable, given the fact that this most likely amounts to a violation of WTO
commitments; at the same time, there is concern that a foreign franchisor might be able to
grant franchises in China without any physical presence for enforcement purposes. Hopefully, this matter will be clarified when the final Franchise Regulation is adopted if not
earlier by way of an interpretation by the MOFCOM. Even if direct off-shore franchising
is explicitly or implicitly allowed, it is likely that foreign franchisors will be required to
obtain some kind of approval or registration from the government, subjecting them to
governmental oversight.24

Yet, so long as the "2 + 1" requirement remains in effect, a foreign franchisor effectively
has no choice but to establish a local presence in China through an FIE.

B. "2 + 1" REQUIREMENT

Unlike the prohibition against direct off-shore franchising, the "2 + 1"requirement also
appears in the draft Franchise Regulation2 and, therefore, appears to be a deliberate public
policy choice by the franchise regulators. 1
Although such a requirement imposes an onerous burden-with apparently scant, if any,
justification- foreign franchisors must face the reality that this now is a requirement in
China. For small franchisors, or franchisors with capital intensive businesses, the cost of
complying with this requirement may create a compelling disincentive to franchise in
China.
Franchisors proceeding in China should explore various ways to satisfy this requirement.
They may want to bring in local partners to form a joint venture to spread the cost sand

risks, and at the same time, obtain local experience and political connections. They may
also want to explore the meaning of "company-owned" units with appropriate government

agencies that will be in charge of the approval process. The Franchise Measures allow units
owned by the franchisor's "subsidiary" or "share-control company" to be counted towards

24. Inthis light, one option foreign franchisors might want to consider is to get an approval from MOFCOM
to offer franchise without setting up FIE. Since the prohibition (the Commercial Sector Measures) was issued
by the MOFCOM, an approval decision from MOFCOM logically should override that prohibition, at least
with regard to the individual case at issue. It remains unclear at this time whether there is a viable option.
25. Chinese franchise regulators also confirmed that such requirement would be applicable even beyond the
initial one-year period (i.e., a franchisor must continually have two company-owned units). Similar requirements have so far not been favored in other countries. One example is Italy, where a "piloting" provision was
dropped from the final version of the law. However, it seems that such a mandatory "piloting" provision is
somehow gaining a bit of traction. Most recently, during the World Franchise Council meeting in March 2005,
there is a proposal to form a "Good Guidance" position on "piloting." It remains to be seen what their position

will be.
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the two-unit requirement. According to one Chinese official, "subsidiary" refers to a company that is 100 percent owned by the franchisor, while "share-control company" refers to
a company that is controlled, but not 100 percent owned, by the franchisor. This raises
several questions: (1) what is exactly a "share-control company" and (2) how much control
is "control"? Franchisors will need to seek answers to these questions with their particular
approval agencies.
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